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The Rough Road for Vietnamese Visa Applicants in Hong Kong:
Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of
State
I. Introduction
Since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, refugees from
Indochina,' Vietnam specifically, have poured into other Southeast
Asian nations in the hopes of resettling. Chief among these areas of
"first asylum" is the nation of Hong Kong.'
It is estimated that Hong Kong has received almost 200,000
Vietnamese refugees over the past twenty years,3 with over 20,000
currently awaiting resettlement.4 The United States has traditionally
been sensitive to the plight of Vietnamese refugees by providing
favorable immigration standards and policy.' However, the State
Department has recently tightened the status requirements that
determine who may apply for a visa at the consular office in Hong
Kong.6 Those Vietnamese that are "screened-out" by these tighter
standards must return to Vietnam to apply for a visa to the United
States.7
The focus of this Note is Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum
Seekers (LAVAS) v. Department of State,8 which questions whether the
State Department, in imposing stricter guidelines for Vietnamese
asylum seekers in Hong Kong, violated the nondiscrimination provision
of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' This case is important
because the court's decision embraces a very literal interpretation of
the nondiscrimination provision.'0
This Note will explore the background facts and holding of LAVAS
in Part II." Part III will involve an examination of the background
law that is specifically applicable to the issues raised and decided in
1 Indochina is a geographic name that has historically referred to modem Vietnam,
Cambodia (Kampuchea) and Laos.
2 Boat People. Final Solution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 1994, at 35. "First asylum" is
defined as the country where refugees first arrive seeking temporary asylum. Josh Briggs, Sur
Place Refugee Status in the Context of Iretnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L, REV.
433, 434 n.7 (1993).
3 Id.
4 Phyllis E. Oakley, Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, DEP'T. ST. DisP.,
July 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
5 See discussion infra part ILA.
6 See infra note 18.
7 See infra note 18.
8 45 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
9 See discussion infra part ILB.2.
10 See discussion infra part IV.
I1 See infra notes 15-69 and accompanying text.
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LAVAS.12  Part IV will provide an analysis of the court's opinion.'
Finally, this Note will conclude in Part V that the court's decision was
incorrect because the State Department did not discriminate against
the Vietnamese in Hong Kong on the basis of nationality. 4 Rather,
the State Department screened out some asylum seekers on the basis
of their refugee status, which is not prohibited by the nondiscrimina-
tion provision.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Background Facts
From the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 until 1989, the United
States and much of the international community granted automatic
refugee status to all Vietnamese asylum seekers who fled from the
communist regime in unified Vietnam. 5 Hong Kong and other
proximately located Southeast Asian nations have been referred to as
countries of "first asylum" because these countries are the initial way-
stations for the resettlement of Vietnamese immigrants. 16 Toward the
late 1980s, a new surge of Vietnamese "boat people" inundated the
refugee camps in Hong Kong.17 The number of refugees waiting to
be processed for resettlement dramatically increased while, at the same
time, departures from camps in Hong Kong declined.'" In 1988, the
Hong Kong government responded by revoking the presumptive
refugee status given to all Vietnamese immigrants. 9 The new policy
called for the screening of all Vietnamese arrivals to determine their
motivation for seeking asylum.2° So called "economic" refugees were
screened out, while "genuine" refugees were screened in.2'
In June 1989, in response to the new influx of Vietnamese asylum
seekers, the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees called a
conference to organize a solution to the flood of Vietnamese immi-
12 See infra notes 70-121 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 122-59 and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
15 Scott McKenzie, Amnesty Sought for Refugees with Criminal Records, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 2, 1994, at 7, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
16 See supra note 2. See also Hong Kong Not Home, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 22,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
17 Still They Come, THE ECONOMIST, May 6, 1989, at 36.
18 Id. In 1987 the number of arrivals to Hong Kong increased 65% while the
departures actually decreased 42%. Id.
19 Brian McCalmon, Winding It Up in Hong Kong. The Increasing Impatience with
Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 8 GEO. IMMIG. Lj. 333, 333 (1994).
20 Id.
21 ASEAN RP Proposal on Boat People to Highlight ASEAN Meet, Reuter Textline, Jan. 13,
1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File. The response by the Hong Kong
government to the influx of Vietnamese was driven by the belief that many of the asylum-
seekers were merely economic migrants. Id. These Vietnamese that were screened out were
detained and slotted for repatriation to Vietnam. Id.
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grants.2 The result was a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) that
was adopted by the United States and 50 other countries.2" The chief
goals of the CPA provisions were: first, the reaffirmance of the first
asylum principle as an initial safeguard for asylum seekers; second, a
place of intermediate refuge for all incoming immigrants until a status
determination could be made; and third, an official preference of
voluntary repatriation for all screened-out asylum seekers with
allowances for alternatives "acceptable under international practices"
if voluntary repatriation proved to be impossible.24
The ambiguous language of the third provision was a source of
concern for the United States because, while not authorizing forced
repatriation, it was not specifically forbidden as an "alternative."25
Nevertheless, the United States organized the implementation of an
Orderly Departure Program (ODP) in Vietnam for the processing and
resettlement of asylum seekers who had been repatriated voluntarily or
forcibly by the Hong Kong government. 26 The ODP allowed for a
visa processing center to be set up in Vietnam with the hopes that this
alternative would encourage voluntary repatriation, and, ideally, deter
Vietnamese who would not qualify as political refugees from leaving
Vietnam in the first place.27
Despite the official policy stated in the CPA, the United States
consulate in Hong Kong continued to process visas for screened-out
asylum seekers who already possessed approved immigrant visa
petitions.28 However, in November 1991, the State Department
22 John A. Calcott, UN. Plan Addresses Vietnamese Boat Refugees, UPI, June 15, 1989,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
23 Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Indochinese Refugees Conference Held in Geneva, DEP'T ST.
BuLL., Oct. 1989, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
24 Id. At the CPA conference, refugee status was to be determined according to the
criteria established by the United Nations, specifically:
The criteria will be those recognized in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, bearing in mind, to the extent appropriate, the
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international
instruments concerning refugees, and will be applied in a humanitarian spirit taking
into account the specific situation of the asylum-seekers concerned and the need to
respect the family unit.
Draft Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action, June 14, 1989, DEP'T ST. BULL., Oct.
1989. See also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signatureJuly 28, 1951,
19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
25 McCalmon, supra note 19, at 334; see also Briggs, supra note 2, at 441.
26 Oakley, supra note 4.
27 Id.
28 The United States allows Vietnamese immigrants who have close relatives that are
resident aliens of the U.S. or are U.S. citizens to sponsor them subject to three administrative
steps. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-56 (1994). First, the sponsor must
file a petition with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 (a) (1995).
Second, if the INS approves the petition, the immigrant must complete and submit a visa
application to the U.S. State Department. 22 C.F.R. § 42.63(a) (1995). Third, the immigrant
must appear at the U.S. consulate and provide various documents to complete the final visa
application. 22 C.F.R. § 42.62(a) (1995).
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instructed the U.S. consulate in Hong Kong to inform screened-out
Vietnamese to return to Vietnam for visa processing through the
ODp. 29 The Hong Kong consulate continued to process certain
screened-out Vietnamese until April 1993, when the State Department
specifically ordered the Hong Kong consulate to cease processing all
screened-out applicants.3 ° This policy came shortly after a decision
by the Hong Kong government to begin forcibly repatriating screened-
out Vietnamese because of overcrowding problems in the refugee
camps."'
B. LAVAS v. Department of State
1. District Court
On February 25, 1994, a suit was filed against the State Depart-
ment by a non-profit corporation, LAVAS, two Vietnamese detainees in
Hong Kong and their American citizen spouses.12 The plaintiffs
alleged that the State Department's visa policy in Hong Kong violated
the Immigration and Nationalization Act because the policy discrimi-
nated against screened-out Vietnamese asylum seekers on the basis of
their nationality.3 The plaintiffs moved for class certification, a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the
State Department.34
On March 2, 1994, the District Court of the District of Columbia
denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, but
consolidated the motion for a preliminary injunction with a determina-
tion on the merits.3 5 On April 28, 1994, the court granted a motion
by the defendants for summary judgement and subsequently denied
the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as moot.3 6
2. Appeal
a. Issue and Holding
On February 3, 1995, an appeal of the judgement of the district
court was brought by plaintiffs to the United States Court Appeals for
29 Princeton Lyman, US Policy on Repatriation of Vietnamese in Hong Kong, DEP'T. ST. Disp.,
Nov. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allnws File.
30 LAVAS v. Dep't. of State, 45 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
31 Lyman, supra note 29.
32 See LAVAS v. Dep't of State, 909 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995). LAVAS described itself
as an organization "whose mission is to provide legal assistance to indigent Vietnamese asylum
seekers." Id. at 4.
33 LAVAS v. Dep't of State, 94-5046, 1994 WL 163723, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per
curiam).
34 See 909 F. Supp. at 2.
35 See id.
36 See id.
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the District of Columbia Circuit. 7 Again, the main issue was whether
the State Department's visa policy in Hong Kong discriminated against
Vietnamese asylum seekers on the basis of nationality.3
The appeals court held that the State Department's visa policy in
Hong Kong violated the nondiscrimination provision of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act because screened-out Vietnamese were being
refused visa processing on the basis of their nationality.39 In accor-
dance with the Administrative Procedure Act,4 ° the court determined
that the State Department's policy was unlawful and thereby reversed
the district court's decision.4' Circuit Judge Randolph dissented,
arguing that the State Department "discriminated" on the basis of
refugee status which is not prohibited by the Immigration and
Nationality Act.4"
b. The Court's Reasoning
The court first looked to the regulation detailing the circumstanc-
es in which an immigrant could have his visa application processed in
a given consular jurisdiction.43 The regulation outlined the basic
procedure for the admission of detained Vietnamese, but the State
Department was allowed the discretion to modify the procedure of the
admission process.4 4 The court conceded that the State Department
was acting within its discretionary power as provided by the regulation
when it required screened-out Vietnamese to apply for visas in
Vietnam.4
5
After determining that the State Department was acting within its
discretionary authority under the admission regulation, the court next
examined whether the State Department's discretionary action violated
the nondiscrimination provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 46 The court had to determine if the language of the statute left
room for the State Department to provide its own interpretation of the
nondiscrimination provision.47
The State Department argued that any discrimination would be
justified if a "rational basis" could be established.48 The State Depart-
37 LAVAS v. Dep't of State, 45 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
38 Id&
39 Id. at 473.
40 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A) (1994). See infra note 59.
41 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 474.
42 Id. at 474-76 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
43 Id. at 472.
44 Id. The regulation is codified at 22 C.F.R. § 42.61(a) (1995). See infra part III.
45 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 472.
46 Id. at 472-73.
47 Id,
48 The State Department cited Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979), as
support for its position. LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473. See discussion infra part III.
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ment claimed that encouraging voluntary repatriation and upholding
the goals of the CPA provided rational bases for its visa policy in Hong
Kong.49 The court rejected this argument, stating that a statutory
provision that has no qualifications or exceptions must be strictly
interpreted.5" Citing Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, l the court
stated that nothing short of a national emergency would allow an
agency to discriminate against immigrants on the basis of nationali-
ty. 52
The court bolstered this finding by citing a Supreme Court
decision, Chevron US.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,51
which set forth a standard for reviewing an agency's interpretation of
the statute it administers.54 The LAVAS court recognized that the
Immigration and Nationality Act provided the administrative proce-
dures for the processing of immigrants.5  Therefore, the State
Department's interpretation was subject to review under that stan-
dard.56 The LAVAS court determined that there was no room for the
State Department's interpretation of the nondiscrimination provision
because the Chevron standard states that no further interpretation is
necessary when Congress is unambiguous about the intent of a
statute.
5 7
Upon finding that the State Department violated the strict
interpretation of the nondiscrimination provision in the Immigration
and Nationality Act,58 the court applied the Administrative Procedure
Act, 9 which required the court to set aside the State Department's
discriminatory action under the visa processing regulation because it
was not in accordance with the law.6° The court remanded the case
to the district court for disposition.6'
49 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473.
50 Id.
51 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
52 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473.
53 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54 Id. at 842-45.
55 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 472-73.
56 Id. at 473. Chevron held that:
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers,
it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
57 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473.
58 Id.
59 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1994). The Administrative Procedure Act provides that an
agency action found not to be in accordance with the law (here, a congressional statute) will
be set aside. Id.
60 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 474.
61 Id. Upon remand, the district court determined that the case had become moot
because the two detainees in Hong Kong had been processed and, therefore, the remaining
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c. Dissent
The dissenting opinion in LAVAS contended that it was the status
rather than the nationality of the individual seeking the visa that
precluded visa processing in Hong Kong." The dissent argued that
the State Department's visa policy did not discriminate against
Vietnamese nationals because they were from Vietnam but that it
merely drew a distinction between classes of Vietnamese who were in
Hong Kong.6 Vietnamese individuals who were legally in Hong Kong
or who had qualified as refugees ("screened-in" Vietnamese) were
permitted to apply for immigrant visas in Hong Kong, while those who
were illegally within Hong Kong's borders or did not fit the interna-
tional definition of refugees ("screened-out" Vietnamese) were
required to return to Vietnam to apply for visas there.64 The dissent
contended that the nondiscrimination statute did not prohibit
discrimination on the basis of the legal or refugee status of individu-
als.6' Therefore, the State Department's visa policy was permissible
under the regulation governing the procedure for visa application.6
The dissent also presented public policy reasons supporting its
conclusion that no violation of the nondiscrimination provision had
occurred. The dissent cited the fact that the United States committed
to the Comprehensive Plan of Action along with fifty other nations in
an international attempt to stem the flood of Vietnamese asylum
seekers into Hong Kong. The dissent further argued that the State
Department's visa policy was aimed at deterring further immigration
from Vietnam, which often entailed a hazardous journey by sea, and
sending a clear signal to screened-out Vietnamese still in Hong Kong
that visa application was only possible back in Vietnam. 6 The dissent
concluded that the majority's opinion would encourage further
immigration from Vietnam and compel first asylum nations, such as
Hong Kong, to begin forcibly repatriating screened-out immigrants. 9
plaintiffs (LAVAS and the detainees' spouses) lacked standing to continue the case. LAVAS
v. Department of State, No. CivA.94361 SSH, 1995 WL 746974, at *2-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 11,
1995).
62 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at .475 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
63 Id. (Randolph, J., dissenting).
64 Id. (Randolph, J., dissenting).
65 Id. (Randolph, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Randolph,J, dissenting). The dissent argued that the regulation, through the
words "[u]nless otherwise directed," allowed the State Department discretion in determining
alternative procedures for the visa application process. Id. (Randolph,J. dissenting) (quoting
22 C.F.RL § 42.61 (1995)).
67 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 474 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 474-75 (Randolph, J., dissenting).
69 Id. (Randolph,J, dissenting). Those who choose voluntary repatriation are given a
lump sum of $290 per person to help with their reintegration into Vietnamese society.
Oakley, supra note 4. The United States has provided over $8 million since 1992 to assist
1996]
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HI. Background Law
In LAVAS, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that the State Department's refusal to process visa applicants from
screened-out Vietnamese violated the nondiscrimination provision of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.70  In doing so, the court
rejected the State Department's contention that a "rational basis"
justified any discrimination that may have occurred.71 With this
decision, the court determined that the nondiscrimination clause in
the Immigration and Nationality Act was to be given a strict interpreta-
tion.72
A. Immigration Legislation
The United States has responded to the continual influx of
immigrants to this country over the past century with various legislative
enactments. The Quota Act of 1921" established temporary quotas
that restricted admission for eligible immigrants to the percentage of
the American citizens with the same national origin.74 Under the
National Origins Act of 1924, 75 these quotas were made permanent,
making immigrant admission contingent upon the national origin of
the immigrant.7 In 1952, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
was passed, resulting in an overhaul of the national origins quota
system.
77
In 1965, the INA was amended to repeal the national origins
quota system and replace it with a system that favored skilled immi-
grants and family members of U.S. residents.7" The amendment
further provided that the issuance of visas was to be conducted without
regard to race, sex or national origin, subject to certain numerical
limitations. 79 This anti-discrimination provision was codified in the
returnees. Id.
70 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
74 Id. at 5-7. The Quota Act specifically stated that:
[T]he number of aliens of any nationality who may be admitted under the
immigration laws of the United States in any fiscal year shall be limited to 3 per
centum of the number of foreign-born persons of such nationality resident in the
United States as determined by the Census of 1910.
Id at 5.
75 The National Origins Act, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
76 Id. at 159.
77 The Immigration and NationalityAct, ch. 477, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(also known as the McCarran-Walter Act).
78 The Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911, 912-13 (1965), repealed in part by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157-59 (1994).
79 The 1965 Amendments provide:
No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the
[Vol. 21
VIETNAMESE VISA APPLICANTS IN HONG KONG
United States Code at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1), and marked the first
broad prohibition against discrimination in United States immigration
legislation.
The legislative history of the nondiscrimination legislation does
not provide any significant commentary on the purposes behind the
prohibition against discrimination. The pertinent commentary on the
new nondiscrimination provision in the 1965 amendments to the INA
merely states that the INA was amended to "establish a new system for
issuance of immigrant visas without regard to national origin."80
Although Section 1152(a) (1) was amended again under the Immigra-
tion Act of 1990,81 the amendment did not substantially change the
nondiscrimination effect of the section. 2
The United States Supreme Court has determined that Congress
is subject to narrow judicial review in the area of immigration
legislation, including statutes that detail the classification of immi-
grants. In Mathews v. Diaz,8" the Court reviewed the constitutionality
of a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that required an
alien to have permanent residence status for five years before
becoming eligible for Medicare benefits."4 In upholding the constitu-
tionality of the eligibility requirement, the Court stated that Congress
had no constitutional duty to provide welfare benefits to all aliens.85
Therefore, the classifications for Medicare eligibility of aliens were
properly within Congressional authority to determine because they
were supported by rational policy concerns of Congress. 6
The next year, in Fiallo v. Bel4 7 the Court reviewed a statute that
issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of
birth ... [p] rovided, [t] hat the total number of immigrant visas and the number
of conditional entries made available to natives of any single foreign state ... shall
not exceed 20,000 in any fiscal year.
Id. at 911-12 (amended 1990).
80 S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328,
3340.
81 Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
82 Id. at 4982.
83 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
84 Id. at 69. The plaintiff claimed that the five-year residency requirement discriminated
against aliens who had not established the required length of residency but had otherwise
qualified under the age requirement. Id. at 70. The eligibility for Medicare provision is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2) (1994).
85 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 82-83.
86 Id. The Court further stated:
For reasons long recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed
to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in these
matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of
classifications must be defined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to
either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary.
Id. at 81.
87 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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excluded male aliens from qualifying as "special preference" immi-
grants through their paternity of illegitimate children, who were
resident aliens or citizens of the United States."8 The Court found
that any discriminatory classification created by Congress was support-
ed by a rational basis, specifically, the potentiality for fraud involved in
false claims of paternity compared to the relative ease in establishing
maternity.8 9 As in Diaz, the Supreme Court affirmed that Congress
may draw potentially discriminatory distinctions if it can demonstrate
that a rational basis for the distinctions exists.9"
B. Administering Immigration Legislation
Section 222(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act delegates
authority to the Secretary of State to promulgate regulations governing
the administrative procedure for the admission of immigrants.91 This
provision details the procedure to be followed for the application of
immigrant visas.92 Three permissible scenarios dictate the jurisdic-
tional requirements for the place of visa application and under what
circumstances the consular office may accept the application.9"
First,, the regulation states that an alien shall apply for an
immigrant visa at the consular office that has jurisdiction over the area
where the alien resides.94 Second, in the case where an alien has no
residence, as in a refugee situation, the alien may apply at the consular
office that has jurisdiction over the area where the alien is physically
present, provided that the alien will be able to remain in that area
until the visa application is completed.95 Third, a consular office may
receive, at its discretion, an application from an alien who is neither
present nor has a place of residence in the jurisdictional area of the
consular office.
9 6
The regulation further states that its administrative procedures are
subject to the discretion of the State Department.97 This section was
88 Sections 101 (b) (1) (D) and (b) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
allow a natural mother to qualify as an immediate relative of her illegitimate child (who is
an alien resident or U.S. citizen) which enables easier admission under the "special immi-
grant" preference classification. Natural fathers are excluded under this classification. See
Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788-89.
89 Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799 & n.8.
90 See id. at 799.
91 Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 222(a), 66 Stat 163 (1952) (present
version codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994)).
92 22 C.F.R. § 42.61 (1995).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. The section also provides that an alien present in the United States will be
considered a resident of his or her last place of residence before entry into the United States.
Id.
97 Id.
[Vol. 21
VIETNAMESE VISA APPLICANTS IN HONG KONG
amended in 1994 to make explicit the discretionary power of the State
Department to depart from the provisions of the regulation.98 The
State Department has stated that this discretionary authority does not
undermine notice of the application procedure to prospective
immigrants because the provisions entailed in the regulation will apply
only in "ordinary circumstances." 99
In a case that set the boundaries for administrative interpretation
of statutory provisions, the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. established a two-part test
intended to determine whether a statute has been violated by an
agency action.'" The first step of the Chevron test involves determin-
ing whether Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue. 01
If the intent of Congress is clear from the statute, then the agency and
the courts must defer to the unambiguous intent of Congress." 2 If
the intent of Congress is silent or unclear, the next step is for the
court to determine if the agency's interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.103 In determining the second
question of the Chevron test, the Court stated that if Congress explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill, then the agency had the authority to
"elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation."'0 4 In
such a case, judicial review is limited to determining if the agency
action is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute."'0 5 Even if this delegation of authority to the agency is only
implicit rather than explicit, the Court held that a reviewing court still
may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute for that of the
agency.1
0 6
In 1979, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided Narenji v. Civiletti, v07 which dealt with the issuance of an
administrative regulation regarding the status of Iranian college
students in the United States.' The regulation provided that all
non-immigrant aliens who are natives or citizens of Iran and in a U.S.
post-secondary school must report to an Immigration and Naturaliza-
98 The comments to the amendment of 22 C.F.R. § 42.61 state: "This rule amends
immigrant visa regulations to make clear that the [State] Department has the authority to
determine where an alien's immigrant visa application shall be processed and to revise the
text thereof for clarity and consistency of usage." 59 Fed. Reg. 39,952 (1994).
99 59 Fed. Reg 39,952, 39,954 (1994).
100 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
101 Id. at 842.
102 Id. at 842-43.
103 Id. at 843.
104 Id. at 843-44.
105 Id. at 844.
106 Id.
107 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
108 The regulation was issued by the Attorney General at the direction of the President
in response to the Iran hostage crisis. Id. at 746.
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tion Service (INS) office. 09 Failure to comply with the reporting
regulation was considered a violation of the conditions for maintaining
the non-immigrant status of the student and subjected them to the
possibility of deportation."o
The court of appeals in Narenji overturned the district court's
finding that the regulation violated the equal protection rights of the
non-immigrant alien students guaranteed by the Constitution."' In
upholding the regulation, the court of appeals stated that the
Executive branch may draw distinctions on the basis of nationality in
the field of immigration as long as there exists a rational basis for the
distinction." 2 The court found that a rational basis was shown by the
government's contention that the regulation was issued as part of the
"fundamental element of the President's efforts to resolve the Iranian
crisis and to maintain the safety of the American hostages in Teh-
ran."','
3
The next year, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida heard Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti."4  In a
strongly worded opinion, the court found that the INS had violated the
Constitution, as well as numerous immigration statutes."' In address-
ing the power delegated to the INS by the Immigration and Nationality
Act, the court stated that the INS must "conform its actions to the
statutes passed by Congress."" 6 The court also noted that Congress
enacted legislation that explicitly prohibited discrimination "on the
basis of 'race, sex, nationality, place of birth and place of residence in
the issuance of visas.""' 7 In interpreting this provision by Congress,
however, the court construed Narenji to hold that the Attorney General
could issue regulations that discriminated on the basis of nationality in
the event of a national crisis." 8
Most recently, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia in Vo Van Chau v. Department of State"9 issued a preliminary
injunction ordering the State Department to refrain from requiring a
109 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979). See Narenji, 617 F.2d at 746. To maintain non-immigrant
status, the Iranian students had to produce proof of enrollment and good standing at the
post-secondary which they attended. Id.
110 Narenji, 617 F.2d at 747.
"' Id. at 748.
112 Id. at 747.
113 Id. The court went on to state that once a rational basis is presented for the
reporting regulation, judicial review of the foreign policy reasons behind the regulation is
improper. Id,
114 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
"5 Id.
116 Id. at 452.
117 Id. at 453 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1994)).
118 Id. at 453 n.13.
19 891 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1995).
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Vietnamese asylum seeker to return to Vietnam for visa processing.' °
The factual scenario was identical to that of LAVAS; thus the court
determined that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits because
of the LAVAS result four months earlier.121
IV. Significance of LAVAS
A. The Majority
With its decision in LAVAS, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia established two significant precedents in the area of
immigration law.122  First, the court determined that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1152(a) was explicit in its prohibition against discrimination in the
issuance of visas.' 23  Second, because of the explicit wording of 8
U.S.C. § 1152(a), the court held that the State Department could not
make an exception to the statute unless the country was faced with a
national emergency. 24 Accordingly, although the State Department
had been delegated the power to issue regulations for the administra-
tion of immigration procedure, these regulations could not violate
unambiguous provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 25
In examining 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a), 26 the LAVAS court relied on
the text of the statute forbidding discrimination to determine that the
provision was explicit in its terms.127  Therefore, the court deter-
mined that the State Department could not apply any exceptions to
the nondiscrimination provision that were not specifically provided by
Congress. 128  The court hypothesized, however, that an exception
might be allowed if a compelling justification, such as a national
emergency, was presented.'29
The court applied the test used in Chevron to reach its conclusion
that the State Department could not apply its own exceptions to the
nondiscrimination statute.' Because the first step of the court's
Chevron analysis indicated that the intent of Congress was unambigu-
ously expressed in the text of the statute,' the court did not find it
necessary to reach the second step of the analysis.3 2 Even if the
120 Id. at 657.
121 Id. at 654. It is worth noting that this case was heard in the same circuit as LAVAS.
122 See supra notes 37-61 and accompanying text.
123 LAVAS v. Dep't of State, 45 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1994).
127 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473. The court noted that "Congress could hardly have chosen
more explicit language." Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See supra notes 53-57, 100-06 and accompanying text.
131 See supra notes 54, 56-57, 101-02 and accompanying text.
132 LAVAS, 45 F.3d at 473.
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court had moved on to the second step, however, it likely would have
found that no "gaps" existed in the statute that might allow for the
State Department to devise its own exceptions.'33 Congress used
explicit language in drafting the nondiscrimination provision, which
states that: "Except as specifically provided [in four other provisions of
the Immigration and Nationality Act]1 4 no person shall receive any
preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an
immigrant visa because of the person's race, sex, nationality, place of
birth, or place of residence.' 35  This language suggests that Con-
gress's intent was that any exceptions to the nondiscrimination
provision should be limited to those exceptions expressly delineated in
the statute itself.
The strict interpretation arrived at by the LAVAS court is bolstered
by an examination of the restraints limiting Congress's ability to pass
legislation that results in discrimination. As reflected in Mathews v.
Diaz and Fiallo v. Bell, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may
enact immigration legislation that results in discriminatory classifica-
tions only as long as it provides a rational basis for doing soY.6 The
exceptions to the nondiscrimination provision in the Immigration and
Nationality Act are all found within the Act, 3 7 and these exceptions
appear to be supported by a rational basis.1 3' Thus, because it has
the responsibility to provide a rational basis for any discriminatory
classifications it might make, Congress would have a compelling reason
to limit any exceptions to the nondiscrimination provision to those it
expressly defined in the Act.3 9 Otherwise, the State Department
might create its own exceptions, which, whether rationally based or
not, would conflict with the intent of Congress.'O
133 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
134 The exceptions are: preference for special immigrant classifications (8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(27) (1994)); preference for immediate relatives of U.S. citizens (8 U.S.C. §
1151(b) (2) (A) (i) (1994)); numerical limitations on the number of immigrants from any
given country (8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(2) (1994)); and provisions regarding the allocation of
immigrant visas (8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)).
135 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1994).
136 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
137 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
138 For example, visas are allocated for immigrants with special labor or academic skills.
See8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3) (1994). The 1965 Amendments to the INA specifically referred to
the advantage of allowing immigrants with "special talents and skills" to enter the United
States. S. REP. No. 748, supra note 80, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.CAN. at 3329.
139 Because the courts allow great deference to Congress in the area of immigration law,
Congress's exceptions to the non-discrimination provision might stand a greater chance of
surviving review than any exceptions devised by the State Department. See Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp 442, 452 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that "[tihere is no area of law
in which Congress has more unreviewable power than in immigration and naturalization
matters").
140 See text accompanying notes 133-34. In addition, the prohibition against
discrimination might lack teeth if an agency could offer its own rationally based justifications
for creating discriminatory classifications.
[Vol. 21
VIETNAMESE VISA APPLICANTS IN HONG KONG
This rationale was articulated by the LAVAS court in its rejection
of the State Department's contention that the D.C. Circuit's earlier
decision in Narenji v. Civiletti allowed for nationality-based discrimina-
tion as long as the agency provided a rational basis for the discrimina-
tion."' The LAVAS court stated that in Narenji, the court had only
upheld the constitutionality of nationality-based regulations promulgat-
ed by the INS and had not considered how a statute expressly
forbidding nationality-based discrimination would have affected that
agency." 2 The LAVAS court noted that, if the State Department
were allowed to create its own rationally based exceptions to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1152(a), the nondiscrimination provision would be rendered a
"virtual nullity."' 4
3
In addition to the limited reading the LAVAS court gave to the
Narenji decision, another basis may be found for distinguishing
between the two opinions. Narenji involved a discriminatory regulation
issued-at the request of. the President--during a national crisis.'"
The situation in LAVAS, on the other hand, involved the State
Department's initiation of a discriminatory visa policy without any
direct Presidential order and without a national crisis.145  Although
the Narenji court stated that the Executive could draw distinctions on
the basis of nationality subject to due process and equal protection
concerns and that such distinctions would be viewed as "consistent with
due process and equal protection if [they were] supported by a
rational basis," 146 the language of the Narenji opinion appeared to
limit the court's holding to Presidential orders made in response to a
national crisis.
In deferring to Presidential authority, the Narenji court stated that
"[c]ertainly in a case such as the one presented here it is not the
business of courts to pass judgment on the decisions of the President
in the field of foreign policy."' 47 This statement implied that imple-
mentation of administrative regulations that are contrary to legislative
intent might only be permissible when direct intervention by the
President is involved, or when there exists a national emergency.48
141 LAVAS v. Dep't of State, 45 F.3d 469, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Narenji v. Civiletti,
617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
145 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
146 Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C.Cir. 1979).
147 Id. The court went on to state that the President was in a superior position to
evaluate the prevailing conditions in foreign countries. Id.
148 For another example of where the national emergency exception was mentioned, see
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp 442, 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
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B. The Dissent
Judge Randolph, in his dissent, took issue with the majority's
underlying premise that the State Department was discriminating on
the basis of nationality by refusing to process the visas of certain
Vietnamese individuals in Hong Kong.'49 The dissent argued that
the State Department's policy resulted in discrimination only on the
basis of the legal status of the individual applying for a visa, and not on
the basis of nationality. 5 ° The dissent's argument focused on the
fact that the State Department was not refusing to process the asylum
applications of all Vietnamese.'51  Rather, the Department only
refused to process the visa applications of Vietnamese people who were
illegally in Hong Kong, while it continued to process the visa applica-
tions of those Vietnamese who were legally there.'52 Thus, the
dissent reasoned, because 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) did not prevent discrimi-
nation on the basis of an individual's legal or refugee status, the State
Department's policy of refusing to process the visas of illegal, or
screened-out, Vietnamese did not violate the nondiscrimination
provision. 15'
The dissent's argument that the State Department did not
discriminate on the basis of nationality appears to be supported by the
favorable treatment of screened-out Vietnamese people who are
required to return to their home country. 54  Once they return to
Vietnam, screened-out individuals are protected from persecution by
monitors provided through the Orderly Departure Program.'5 5 In
addition, the screened-out individuals are permitted to reapply for U.S.
visas once they return to Vietnam. 6 Such treatment would appear
to be inconsistent with any intention by the State Department to
discriminate against these screened-out individuals on the basis of their
nationality.
Despite Judge Randolph's arguably persuasive points, his
dissenting opinion has not gained acceptance in the D.C. Circuit. 157
Vo Van Chau v. Dep't. of State adopted the majority's decision in LAVAS
by holding that the State Department's refusal to process screened-out
refugees violated 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) because the practice constituted
discrimination on the basis of nationality.' This holding, decided
149 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
150 LAVAS v. Dep't of State, 45 F.3d 469, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Randolph,J, dissenting).
i1 Id. (RandolphJ, dissenting).
152 Id. (Randolph, J, dissenting).
153 Id. (RandolphJ, dissenting).
154 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
155 Oakley, supra note 4.
156 See supra text accompanying note 27.
157 SeeVo Van Chau v. Dep't of State, 891 F. Supp. 650 (D.D.C. 1995).
158 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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just four months after the LAVAS case,'5 9 seemed to close the door
on any opportunity for the dissent's argument in LAVAS to gain
significant ground.
V. Conclusion
The LAVAS court has decisively established that it is beyond the
State Department's authority to provide its own interpretation of the
Congressional statute that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
nationality in the issuance of visas. This decision limits the power
delegated to agencies for the administration of immigration statutes.
Regulations issued by administrative agencies must strictly comply with
the specific statutes enacted by Congress, particularly when those
regulations allow for discretionary action by the agencies.6
However, despite the majority's clear holding to the contrary in
LAVAS and its subsequent affirmation in Vo Van Chau, it is arguable
whether the nondiscrimination provision of the Immigration and
Nationality Act truly was violated by the State Department's visa
application policy in Hong Kong. It seems clear that the State
Department refused to consider the visa applications of certain
Vietnamese individuals, not because of their national origin, but rather
because they did not qualify as political refugees under international
law and were within the borders of Hong Kong illegally.
This contention is supported, in part, because, even after
screened-out individuals returned to Vietnam, they still were permitted
to reapply for U.S. visas at centers set up under the Orderly Departure
Program. Further, the distinctions drawn as to refugee status by the
State Department appeared to be grounded in reasonable policy goals
intended to alleviate the overcrowding of refugee camps in Hong Kong
and to deter economic refugees from leaving Vietnam in the first
place. These factors contradict the majority's finding in LAVAS that
the State Department's policy discriminated on the basis of nationality.
For this reason, it appears that the dissent may have had the stronger
argument when it contended that the State Department's visa policy
did not violate the nondiscrimination statute.
ANDREW SMITH
159 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.160 For example, in this case, the visa procedure regulation allowed the State Department
the discretion to mandate alternative application procedures, but the Department was not
allowed to use that discretion in violation of a nondiscrimination statute.
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